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Introduction
The past 15 years have witnessed major changes
in the regulation and structure of the U.S. financial
services industry. These changes have been driven
by technology, by the emergence of new, largely
unregulated competitors, and by the general per-
formance of the economy. Consequently, a wide
array of new products and services and more com-
petitive pricing and delivery systems have been
made available to consumers. But some argue
that these changes have come at a cost, alleging
that certain consumers, particularly those in low-
income and minority neighborhoods, have been
abandoned by the banking system.
Concern has focused primarily on two areas:
depository services and mortgage and consumer
lending. Consumer groups contend that new mar-
ket pressures and regulatory freedom have led
financial institutions both to establish explicit fees
for depository services that had traditionally been
offered free of charge and to direct their branch
systems to serve more affluent (and profitable)
customers. Similar arguments have been made
about mortgage and consumer lending, with
financial institutions accused of deliberately limit-
ing their lending in poor and minority areas. The
industry has countered by noting that if fees have
risen, it is because of higher costs; if offices have
been closed, it is because they are unprofitable;
and if fewer loans have been made in low-
income and minority areas, it is because demand
there has slipped.
Despite considerable debate in both the
media and academic circles, there has been sur-
prisingly little hard data produced to support .
either argument. Thus, not only are the underly-
ing causes and consequences of change in the
financial system at issue, but so are the facts
about the size and scope of such change. This
article looks at one small aspect of the debate:
changes in the location of financial institution
offices. Telephone book Yellow Pages for 1977
and 1989 are used to estimate the pre- and post-
deregulation size and distribution of the finan-
cial industry's branch system in the metropolitan
areas of Detroit, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Bos-
ton, and Atlanta. In assessing these data, I at-
tempt to determine whether a disproportionate
number of offices have been closed in low-
income and minority neighborhoods over this
period, and also whether such neighborhoods
are currently served by disproportionately -
fewer offices. The comparisons control for pop-
ulation and other demographic factors such as
housing and employment.Clearly, restricting the study to five metropoli-
tan areas limits its usefulness. However, all of
the cities chosen have been the subject of media
allegations of discrimination by their respective
banking systems. Each not only has large and
geographically segregated minority communi-
ties, but also a well-defined banking market
with few branching restrictions, offering finan-
cial firms a wide range of options with which to
respond to changing economic conditions.
Thus, one can argue that if changes in the finan-
cial services industry have hurt low-income and
minority consumers disproportionately over the
past 15 years, the effects would likely show up
in one of these cities.
I. Background
The financial services industry looked quite differ-
ent in the mid-1970s than it does today. The con-
sumer depository services market was dominated
by commercial banks, but federal and state regula-
tions limited the types of products they could offer,
the prices they could charge, and the geographic
areas in which they could operate. Restricted in
their ability to compete for consumer deposits
through prices, banks competed through such
nonprice means as extensive branching networks,
free or low-cost accounts, and other subsidized
services. Savings and loans (thrifts) and credit
unions competed with commercial banks for
savings-type accounts; however, they could not
offer transaction services and were required to
operate under price restrictions similar to those
that governed commercial banks. In part because
of state usury laws, the consumer loan market was
highly segmented, with finance companies serv-
ing the higher-risk end of the market and commer-
cial banks serving the lower-risk end. The home-
loan market was dominated by commercial banks
and savings and loans; mortgage bankers played
a comparatively small role.
Today, the structure of the industry is consid-
erably different. Starting in 1981, price restrictions
on depository services were gradually lifted, and
by 1986, they were virtually eliminated. Thrifts,
credit unions, money market funds, and even
finance companies can now actively compete for
any type of consumer depository account. Further-
more, because many state usury laws have been
eliminated, the nature of the consumer loan mar-
ket has also changed. Consumers are now much
more likely to secure open-end lines of credit that
can be drawn down at their convenience rather
than the closed-end contracts tied to a specific
purchase that had characterized the industry in
the 1970s. Commercial banks, thrifts, and
finance companies now appear to compete
actively for all segments of the consumer loan
market. The mortgage market has seen similar
changes. Growth of the secondary market has
resulted in considerable standardization of the
loan application process and has ensured that
mortgage originators have a ready outlet for
their loans. This has made it much easier for
firms that specialize in originating loans (rather
than holding them for their portfolio) to flour-
ish. Moreover, federal preemption of usury ceil-
ings on home-purchase loans has helped to
guarantee an adequate flow of mortgage credit.
The effect of these changes on consumers is
unclear. On one hand, consumers appear to be
the beneficiaries of more competitive pricing in
both the depository and loan markets. On the
other hand, the shift toward explicit and competi-
tive pricing may have harmed those consumers
who enjoyed cross-subsidies under the old, heav-
ily regulated system. The potential for conflicting
effects was foretold in 1979 by two consumer
groups testifying before Congress on the removal
of depository price restrictions. The Consumers
Union strongly supported deregulation, yet the
Consumer Federation of America hesitated, argu-
ing that the poor might be adversely affected (see
Brobeck and Cooper [1991]).
Arguments supporting the view that low-
income consumers have been harmed by dereg-
ulation can be summarized as follows (see
Canner and Maland [1987]):
• Explicit pricing of depository services may
price some consumers out of the market,
pushing such items as a basic checking ac-
count beyond their reach.
• The reduction of bank profit margins stem-
ming from more competitive market condi-
tions may lead depository institutions to close
marginal offices, which are more likely to be in
low-income neighborhoods. Furthermore,
more-lenient federal merger guidelines could
accelerate the closure process.
• Competitive forces may move banks up-
market, shifting their business toward more
affluent consumers who purchase many
products.
• Raised credit standards resulting from the
shift toward open-end loans may ration the
poor out of the consumer loan market. If
financial firms prefer to lend to their
depository services customers, consumers
priced out of the depository market may be
rationed out of the loan market as well. .
The gist of these arguments is that the pricing
system in effect prior to deregulation favoredlow-income consumers, who gave up little in
forgone interest because of small account sizes,
but benefited substantially from underpriced
services. In effect, such pricing amounted to a
cross-subsidy of low-income consumers, but be-
cause profit margins were high enough, banks
were satisfied with the arrangement. Under an
explicit pricing system and narrower margins,
these same consumers may be priced out of the
market unless financial institutions are forced to
offer subsidized basic depository accounts. But
Canner and Maland (1987) point out that requir-
ing firms to offer such accounts could raise the
cost of doing business in poorer neighborhoods
and thus lead to office closures there.
Most discussion about the effects of deregula-
tion has focused on low-income consumers.
There is a long-standing concern that minorities,
even those who are not poor, have been ill served
by the financial services industry (Avery and
Buynak [1981]). Surveys have consistently shown
that minorities are less likely than whites of the
same income level to own checking or savings
accounts or to use depository institutions for
loans. Analysts disagree, however, about whether
this is a result of discrimination, differential
demand, or sound economic reasons such as cost.
Moreover, it is unclear what effect deregulation
may have had on minorities. If disproportionately
poor service in the minority community stemmed
from discrimination, then one might expect condi-
tions to improve as competitive pressures made it
more difficult for firms to discriminate. On the
other hand, if reduced service arose from cost fac-
tors or weak demand, then it might be exacer-
bated by increased competition and price changes.
Regulatory responses to these potentially
adverse effects on low-income (and minority)
consumers have been mixed. The 1975 Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the 1977 Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act (CRA) established federal
regulatory processes to encourage financial in-
stitutions to meet the credit needs of their entire
community — including low-income areas —
as long as such practices were consistent with
safe and sound banking practices. Both Acts
were strengthened in 1989; however, their
specific implications, as well as regulators' abil-
ity to take a proactive role in their enforcement,
remain uncertain (Avery [1989D-
Federal legislation related to basic depository
services has been introduced before Congress
many times, but none of these efforts has been
successful. In 1986, the Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council approved a policy
statement that endorsed and encouraged finan-
cial institutions to offer a basic package of
depository services to low-income customers
(Canner and Maland [1987]). Although the CRA
pertains primarily to credit needs, an institu-
tion s record of opening and closing offices —
as well as the services it provides at specific
locations — has been recognized in the CRA
assessment procedures (Mitchell [1990]). This
link was made more explicit in a joint statement
issued by the federal financial institution regu-
latory agencies in March 1989. The new policy
allows provision of basic financial sen-ices such
as low-cost checking accounts to be considered
in determining an institution's CRA rating.
Despite concerns about the impact of deregu-
lation on low-income consumers and on the
level of service within the black community in
particular, very little systematic evidence has
been produced. Results of mortgage lending
studies are mixed. Using 1981 data. Avery and
Canner (1984) find statistically significant evi-
dence that, controlling for other factors, minority
neighborhoods received fewer mortgage loans
from commercial banks and savings and loans
in only nine of 100 standard metropolitan statis-
tical areas (SMSAs) studied. Using more recent
data, however, Bradbury, Case, and Dunham
(1989) find substantial evidence of such effects
in Boston. In addition, detailed newspaper
accounts in Atlanta, Detroit, Cleveland, and Bos-
ton all produced evidence that led some to con-
clude that discrimination existed in these cities'
mortgage markets in the late 1980s.
1
Evidence concerning deregulation's impact
on the use of depository services is also incon-
clusive (Canner and Maland [1987]). Household
surveys taken by the Federal Reserve Board in
1977 and 1983 show a decline in the propensity
of the lowest-income consumers to use deposi-
tory accounts over this period. However, Canner
and Maland point out that this drop-off can be
• explained by rising unemployment and demo-
graphic changes over the same interval. They also
cite a 1986 Federal Reserve Board survey showing
that of those respondents who lacked a checking
account, none named fees or minimum balance
requirements as the reason. Scon (1988), citing a
survey of low-income consumers, reports that
two-thirds of the respondents who did not
have a checking account had never had one.
Thus, although there is evidence of a large,
disproportionately black population of low-
income consumers who do not own depository
• 1 See "The Color of Money," Atlanta Constitution, May 1-4,1988,
p.'1; "The Race for Money," Detroit Free Press, June 24-27,1988. p. 1;
"Banks Give Poor Areas Few Loans," The Plain Dealer, October 10,
1989, p. 1; and "Inequities Are Cited in Hub Mortgages," TheBoston
Globe, January 1,1989, p. 1.accounts, it is unclear whether the size of this
population has increased since deregulation.
Another potential means of evaluating the im-
pact of changes in the financial services indus-
try on low-income and minority consumers is to
look at office closings and openings. If low-
income and minority areas have suffered a dis-
proportionate number of such closures over the
past 15 years, this could signal a reduction in
services in these neighborhoods. Unfortunately,
few studies of office closures have been con-
ducted.
2 Section II attempts to fill this gap by
comparing the financial industry branch systems
in Detroit, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Boston, and
Atlanta at the onset of deregulation in 1977
against the systems in place in 1989-1990. The
purpose of these comparisons is twofold: to
determine whether a disproportionate number
of offices were closed in low-income and minor-
ity neighborhoods over this period, and to test
whether such neighborhoods are currently be-
ing served by disproportionately fewer offices.
II. Empirical Setting
The empirical procedures used to examine each
of the five cities were similar. I selected the geo-
graphic areas covered by the "center city" Yellow
Pages in each metropolitan region as the study
areas for each city. Typically, this zone included
the city proper and most inner suburbs. For Bos-
ton and Cleveland, however, substantial por-
tions of the outer suburbs were included as well.
Except for Atlanta, all areas were of roughly
equal population.
3
I compiled basic data on office locations as.
follows: The 1977 and 1989-1990 Yellow Pages
for each city were used to compile address lists
for four separate types of institutions: commer-
cial banks, thrifts (savings and loans and mutual
savings banks), check cashing companies, and
loan (both business and consumer finance) and
mortgage companies.
4 Institutions included
under the headings Banks, Savings and Loans,
• 2 One exception is a report in The New York Times (January 30,
1989) showing that bank closures in the New York SMSA between 1985
and 1988 were disproportionately located in low-income areas. Dennis
(1984) reports evidence from a Federal Reserve Board study showing that
the overall ratio of commercial bank openings to closures fell from 5:1 in
1979 to 1.9:1 in 1983.
• 3 The Atlanta study area included 825,000 residents, whi le the
other four areas ranged from 1,400,000 to 1,650,000 residents.
• 4 Phone book publication dates were as follows: 1977 and 1989
(no month given) for Atlanta, January 1978 and 1990 for Boston, May
1977 and 1989 for Cleveland, September 1977 and 1988 for Detroit, and
March 1977 and 1990 for Philadelphia.
Check Cashing Service, Financing, Loans, or
Mortgages were added to the lists. I classified
offices listed under multiple headings according
to their primary activity. For example, a bank
office was counted as a commercial bank unless
it was clearly only a loan production office.
Commercial and mutual savings bank addresses
were also cross-checked against the June 1977
and June 1988 Summary of Deposits address list
filed with federal regulators, resulting in the
addition of a few offices not listed in the Yellow
Pages. I did not count drive-in windows and
automated teller machines (ATMs) unless they
either had separate addresses (and were listed
in the Yellow Pages) or qualified as separate
offices under federal guidelines.
Institutional offices were further sorted and
aggregated by U.S. Postal Service five-digit ZIP
Code areas (ZCAs) corresponding to the study
area of each city. In total, 230 ZCAs were used.
5
Offices outside the study areas were discarded
even though listed in the Yellow Pages.
The decision to aggregate data to the ZCA
level was based on several factors. First, it is
comparatively easy to classify addresses by ZCA
with a high degree of accuracy. Second, ZCAs
are large enough (30,000 residents on average)
to encompass both residential areas and the busi-
ness districts that serve them. This is not so for
some other measures, including census tracts.
Although census tracts are designed to be eco-
nomically and demographically homogeneous,
they are comparatively small (4.000 to 5,000 per-
sons) in large metropolitan areas. Thus, many
residential census tracts contain few business
offices, yet are located next to business districts
that provide ready access to their residents.
6
Though this is not necessarily a drawback for
studies that use households as their unit of
analysis, it poses a real problem for studies such
as this one that use financial institution offices
as the observational unit.
7
Using ZCAs also has disadvantages. For
instance, these areas were set up for the
• 5 Twenty-eight of the 258 ZCAs corresponding to the study areas
were excluded because theyxontained too few residents. This criterion
eliminated the central business districts of each city.
• 6 Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Cleveland), for example, contains 357
census tracts but only 50 ZCAs. In 1989, an average of 4,010 people
lived in each census tract, compared with 28.634 people in each ZCA.
The average number of commercial banking offices in these ZCAs was
5.6, while census tracts averaged 0.8. More than half of the census tracts
had no banking offices at all. -
• 7 One alternative would be to consider offices within contiguous
census tracts as accessible to an individual. However, this procedure
might erase many of the inherent advantages of homogeneity that make
census tract data attractive in the first place.TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics, by ZCAs
Median annual household income, 1989
Average ZCA median
Percent of ZCAs above $30,000
Percent of ZCAs between
S20.000 and S30.000
Percent of ZCAs below $20,000
Racial composition, 1989
Average percent black
Percent of ZCAs below 10% black
Percent of ZCAs between 10% and
50% black
Percent of ZCAs above 50% black
Housing, 1980
Average median value
Number of units per capita
Employment
3
Employees per capita, 1986
Firms per 10.000 people, 1986





















































































































a 1986 employment figures are deflated to per capita terms using 1989 population estimates.
b. 19 population figures are estimated as the weighted average of 1980 (weight of 0.7) and 1970 (weight of 0.3) population values.
c. A ZCA is considered "center city" if the majority of its area falls within the boundaries of the city proper.
NOTE: Sample excludes a total of 11 central-business-district ZCAs and 17 other ZCAs with fewer than 5.000 residents in 1989.
SOURCE: Author's calculations based on CAC1 data.
convenience of the Postal Service and its ground
transportation system, not for statistical analysis.
Thus, boundaries do not necessarily correspond
to natural socioeconomic divisions and in many
cases cut across city or county lines. ZCAs also
suffer from the same problem as census tracts in
that residents on the edge of one area may do
their shopping in another. Nevertheless, ZCAs
do vary substantially in their economic and ra-
cial composition, even if not by design. If finan-
cial institutions differentially serve black and
low-income neighborhoods, gross patterns
should be apparent at the ZCA level (though
more accurate analysis might require a different
unit of geographic aggregation).
Independent variables, also defined at the
five-digit ZCA level, were primarily constructed
from data reported in The Sourcebook of Demo-
graphics and Buying Power for Every ZIP Code
in the USA, published by Consolidated Analysis
Centers. Inc. (CACI) in 1989. CACI aligns census
data with ZCA boundaries to estimate 1980
measures of median household income, median
owner-occupied housing value, population
(total and by race), and number of housing units
(a proxy for household size). The organization
also provides 1989 estimates of population and
median household income by ZCA, 1986 esti-
mates of the number of firms and employees
operating in each ZCA (based on independent
information), and 1980 white-collar employ-
ment figures (based on census data).
Characteristics of the sample, broken down
by city, are given in table 1. Although the five
city samples correspond to areas of roughly
equal size, they reflect differing demographic
characteristics, with Detroit and Philadelphia
clustered into one group, Cleveland and BostonTABLE 2
Number of Offices per


















































































SOURCE: Author's calculations based on Yellow Pages data.
into another, and Atlanta showing characteristics
of both pairs.
For Detroit and Philadelphia, most of the study-
area ZCAs are located in the center city. Although
each center city contains many middle-income
neighborhoods, most of the middle- and upper-
income suburbs are excluded. The racial com-
position of the middle-class neighborhoods of
the two cities differs somewhat. Philadelphia
contains more middle-income white ethnic
areas, while Detroit's middle-class neighbor-
hoods are more likely to be black. Each city suf-
fered a significant decline in population between
1977 and 1989 (16.7 percent in Detroit and 8.1
percent in Philadelphia). Housing prices, median
family income, and employment are similar, but
significantly below those of the other three cities.
About one-third of both cities" ZCAs are more
than 50 percent black and have median annual
household incomes of less than S20.000.
Detroit's and Philadelphia's commercial
banking markets are also comparable. Each city
is dominated by five or six large branch-banking
systems that have undergone significant change
since 1977 (through mergers and consolidation
in Detroit and through purchases by out-of-area
banks in Philadelphia). Their thrift markets
differ somewhat, though. Detroit has compara-
tively few thrifts, whereas Philadelphia has many
small, neighborhood thrifts plus two large
branch systems.
Data for the Cleveland and Boston study
areas also track fairly closely. Unlike Philadel-
phia and Detroit, each contains many of the
cities' suburbs, with only about one-third of the
study-area ZCAs located in the center city. In
addition, fewer than 20 percent of each city's
study-area ZCAs have black majorities or
median annual household incomes of less than
S20,000, and median housing values are almost
twice those of Philadelphia and Detroit. Employ-
ment data also differ between the two pairs, with
more employees per capita and more white-collar
workers in Boston and Cleveland.
Both Boston and Cleveland have several
areawide branch-banking systems. Consolida-
tions occurred between 1977 and 1989, generally
through holding companies rather than mergers.
Both cities also have large, competitive thrift
systems.
The Atlanta study area differs from the other
four in several ways. As noted above, Atlanta's
sample population is only slightly more than
half that of the other four cities. Moreover,
Atlanta's population is growing, whereas that of
the other cities is contracting. Housing values arc
similar to those of Boston and Cleveland, while
racial composition is comparable to that of Phila-.
delphia and Detroit. Median income and the
percentage of study-area ZCAs located in the cen-
ter city fall between the Cleveland/Boston and
Philadelphia/Detroit range. The status of AtlantaTABLE 3
Number of Offices per 10,000 People

































































































as a regional distribution center is reflected in its
large number of firms and employees.
Atlanta not only has the highest number of
banking offices per capita of the five study sites,
but its banking industry (particularly branch
banking) grew dramatically over the 13 years
covered here. The number of mortgage com-
pany offices, including many regional head-
quarters, also rose considerably and at a much
higher rate than in any of the other cities.
III. Results
Modest growth occurred in the per capita num-
ber of offices for almost all institution types and
cities between 1977 and 1989 (table 2). Overall,
per capita growth was up 12 percent for com-
mercial bank offices, 9 percent for thrift offices,
500 percent for check cashing offices, and 2 per-
cent for loan and mortgage company offices.
The only sectors showing a decline in service
were commercial banks and thrifts in Boston
and loan and mortgage companies in Cleveland,
Detroit, and Philadelphia.
8 The uptick in the
per capita number of branches for each type of
institution seems to contradict the commonly
held belief that deregulation would lead to a
reduced number of "brick and mortar" offices.
Indeed, branch services seem to have grown
over this period.
Growth in the number of offices between 1977
and 1989 does not appear to be uniform across
socioeconomic groups (table 3)- While the per
capita number of thrift and commercial bank
offices jumped 14 percent in predominantly white
and integrated ZCAs, areas that were more than
50 percent black showed an 11 percent decline.
Interestingly, this difference does not show up
when ZCAs are arrayed by income, even though
• 8 The latter figures are somewhat deceptive because they reflect a
change in the mix between mortgage and loan companies. In all live
• cities, loan and finance companies showed a substantial decline in the
per capita number ol offices over the study period, while mortgage com-
pany offices grew in importance. Atlanta is a large regional mortgage cen-
ter and thus has an artificially inflated number of mortgage production
offices. The Boston real estate market also was very active during the
1977-1989 period, and its mortgage company offices grew rapidly.TABLE 4
City Differences in Commercial
Banks' and Thrifts' Level of Service
Due to Race or Income





































































































































































a. Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
b. Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTE: Dependent variable: number of offices per 10.000 people in 1989. Coefficients are reported for two separate regressioas. one for in-
come and one for race. Each regression had an intercept and two dummy variables. Total regressions (column 6) had separate intercepts for
each city. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
the race and income divisioas are designed to sep-
arate die sample into groups of similar size. The per
capita number of thrift and commercial bank offices
increased 6 percent in the poorest ZCAs (those with
a median annual household income of less than
520.000) — a growth rate below that of the richest
areas (17 percent) but above that of the middle-
income areas (4 percent).
Check cashing and loan and mortgage com-
panies show a more consistent relationship with
race and income. Check cashing companies
grew most rapidly in low-income and predomi-
nantly black areas, while the number of loan
and mortgage company offices contracted sub-
stantially in all but the predominantly white and
high-income areas. The latter figures reflect the
predominance of mortgage companies in high-
income areas and of finance companies in low-
and middle-income and black areas.
Although the change in the number of finan-
cial institution offices between 1977 and 1989 does
not appear to be strongly related to income, there
Ls a significant correlation between income and the
number of offices existing in 1989. On a per capita
basis, low-income areas had 35 percent fewer
commercial bank offices and less than one-third
as many thrift offices as high-income areas. These
differences are even larger when predominantly
black areas are compared with predominantly
white areas.
City differences in the level of sendee provided
by commercial banks and thrifts are shown in
table 4. Coefficients from simple regressions
differentiating only race and income (separately)
are given for each city. The coefficients for the
two racial dummy variables reflect the gross dif-
ference in the number of offices per capita be-
tween integrated/predominantly black areas
and predominantly white areas for each city in
1989. Coefficients for the two income dummiesTABLE 5
Factors Affecting Financial








Home value (S 10,000)
Housing units per capita






































































































































































































a. Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
b. Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
NOTE: Dependent variable: number of offices per 10,000 people in 1989 City intercepts reflect the difference between each of the included
cities and Cleveland. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author s calculations.
reflect similar differences between middle- and
low-income neighborhoods and high-income
neighborhoods.
In all five cities, predominantly black areas
have significantly fewer commercial bank
offices per capita than predominantly white
areas. Differences range from more than 2.50
offices per 10,000 people in Atlanta to 0.85
offices in Cleveland and are statistically signifi-
cant in all cases except Boston. Similar, though
less significant, differences show up across
income groups as well. The number of thrift
offices per capita is also related to both race and
income. In all cases, the thrift differences are
more statistically significant than the commercial
bank differences, although the magnitude of the
former is larger only for Boston, Cleveland, and
Philadelphia. One explanation for this finding is
that the thrift regressions have a better overall fit
(R
2), reflecting a more consistent relationship
between income/race and office location.
Clearly, conclusions drawn from simple regres-
sions such as these can be misleading. Black and
low-income areas may be less desirable to finan-
cial .institutions not because of race or income
per se, but because of other factors that are cor-
related with race and income, such as housing
values and business employment. Moreover,TABLE 6
Factors Affecting the Change in
Financial Intermediaries' Service
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a. Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
h. Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
NOTE. Dependent variable: change in the number of offices per 10.000 people. 1977-1989. City intercepts reflect the difference between
each of the included cities and Cleveland. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors calculations.
because income and race are themselves highly
correlated, it is difficult to determine which of
the two factors is more important in predicting
financial institution behavior. To address this
concern, I ran regressions for each institution
type controlling for median home values, per
capita number of owner-occupied homes, num-
ber of firms and employees, percentage of
employed residents with white-collar jobs, and
dummy variables for race, income, center city
location, and each sample city. Results are pre-
sented in table 5.
The estimated difference in commercial banks'
level of service resulting from neighborhood racial
and income characteristics shrinks considerably
when other factors are controlled for: Home val-
ues, employment, and the number of housing
units appear to be more important determinants.
By contrast, neighborhood racial composition
(but not income) is still a strong predictor of
thrift institution behavior. Except for check cash-
ing offices in predominantly black areas, racial
and income characteristics do not appear to
play a significant role in the location of either
check cashing or mortgage and loan offices.
Similar conclusions emerge about the change
in the number of offices between 1977 and
1989 (table 6). Racial and income effects allTABLE 7
City Differences in Commercial
Banks'and Thrifts'Level of


















































































































a. Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
b. Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTE: Dependent variable: number of offices per 10,000 people in 1989. Regressions are similar to those in table 5. Coefficients for vari-
ables other than race and income are available upon request. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
but disappear when other factors are con-
trolled for in the commercial bank regression,
but thrift institutions appear to have signifi-
cantly reduced their presence in predominantly
black areas. Surprisingly, ceteris paribus, the
number of thrift offices in low-income areas
seems to have expanded. These effects nearly
offset each other in low-income black areas;
thus, it is middle- and high-income black
neighborhoods that seem to have suffered the
greatest decline in service.
Finally, regressions similar to those presented
in table 5 were run for commercial banks and
thrifts at the individual city level (see table 7,
which reports only the coefficients for income
and race). Although few of these coefficients
are statistically significant (in part because of
the small sample sizes), they suggest that the
aggregate regressions may mask individual city
differences. For example, ceteris paribus, pre-
dominantly black areas are served by compara-
tively more offices in Atlanta than in Cleveland,
Detroit, and Philadelphia. The only statistically
significant effects are differences based on race
for Cleveland and Philadelphia thrifts. In both
cases, integrated and predominantly black areas
are much less likely to be served by thrifts than
are predominantly white areas.
9
IV. Conclusion
This study finds little evidence that commercial-
bank branch services in low-income and minority
neighborhoods have been disproportionately
reduced since 1977 in any of the five cities exam-
ined. Changes in the per capita number of com-
mercial bank offices between 1977 and 1989 differ
• 9 I also ran other regressions to test the robustness of Die results
presented in this section. Changes in the level of services were fit as func-
tions of the change in ZCAs' racial composition and income levels. Racial
and income effects were represented by their 1977 and 1989 values and
as continuous variables. I also used additional control variables such as
the percentage of the population living below the poverty level, CACI-
constructed indices reflecting the "purchasing potential' for saving and
borrowing, and age of the housing stock. In no case did these additions
or changes alter the conclusions reported in this section in any substan-
tial way.only slightly between predominantly black or low-
income ZCAs and those that are high-income or
predominantly white. Moreover, these differences
are not statistically significant and nearly disap-
pear when other demographic factors such as
housing and employment are controlled for.
Evidence also suggests that once these other fac-
tors are taken into account, the number of offices
in low-income and predominantly black neigh-
borhoods is similar to that of other areas. This
finding holds both in the aggregate and, for the
most part, in the five cities individually.
The results also indicate that thrift institutions
have been more likely to close offices in predomi-
nantly black (but not low-income) neighborhoods
during the past 15 years and that, currently, thrifts
are less likely to be located in these areas. The
aggregate results seem to be driven primarily by
the behavior of thrifts in Cleveland and Philadel-
phia. Some of this effect may be traceable to the
fact that firms acquiring the branch networks of
failed savings and loans were more likely to shut
down inner-city offices than those in the suburbs.
But this does not explain why offices in minority
rather than low-income areas were closed.
Finally, evidence shows that check cashing
companies have been more likely to open offices
in predominantly black areas, and that once other
variables are controlled for, race and income
appear to play no significant role in the change in
loan and mortgage company office location.
It is interesting to note that despite claims that
deregulation would lead to fewer financial institu-
tion offices overall, the number of branches of
each type of firm used in this study actually in-
creased over the sample period. This finding is
true both in absolute and in per capita terms and
appears to hold for each of the cities studied, even
though their patterns of demographic and eco-
nomic growth differ considerably. Thus, failure to
observe significant differential effects in low-
income and minority areas should be viewed in
light of the fact that some of the overall predictioas
regarding deregulation may not have materialized.
On the surface, these findings lend little sup-
port to those who allege that the financial serv-
ices industry has weakened its commitment to
low-income and minority areas over the past
decade and a half. However, caution should be
used in extrapolating too much from the results.
Sample sizes used here are comparatively small,
and the unit of analysis. ZCAs, is not ideal. Fur-
thermore, there is enough evidence of hetero-
geneity in the cities selected to suggest that the
results may not apply to other localities.
One should also bear in mind that office clos-
ings are not the only signal of management deci-
sions to reduce service in an area. Office staffs
and hours can be cut back, and purchases of
higher-priced, more technologically advanced
equipment such as ATMs can be put on hold. In-
deed, given the relatively low office-space
prices in many poor and minority neighbor-
hoods, it may be quite possible for a financial in-
stitution to run a scaled-down office on a
profitable basis even if demand has dropped off.
Thus, further research on the quality of serv-
ice may be necessary before definitive conclu-
sions can be drawn about the impact of changes
in the financial services industry on minorities
and the poor.References
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